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The Global Land Rush: 
Implications for Food, Fuel, and the 
Future of Development
Rachel Nalepa 
Abstract
Foreign direct investment in agricultural land in developing countries has escalated 
dramatically in recent years, attracting the attention of mainstream media outlets 
around the world. Often referred to as the “global land rush” or “global land grab,” 
these investments are made specifically to transform arable land into profitable and 
more productive agricultural enterprises for food and agrofuel stocks for use by the 
investor countries. Proponents advocate for a “win-win” scenario, maintaining 
that concessions not only benefit investors, but that spillover effects like technology 
transfer and increased employment will jumpstart agricultural productivity in 
developing states. Critics generally believe that these deals will result in more harm 
than good, especially in places where land rights are historically contentious or 
weak. Using recent evidence, this paper examines the emerging political economy of 
the global land rush and discusses how insecure tenure rights and poor governance 
are resulting in adverse short-term effects that call into question whose notion of 
“development” is being served through these concessions. It also aims to go beyond 
debating the merits of the “win-win” scenario to discuss how a historical and naïve 
approaches to agricultural investment on behalf of foreign investors, combined with 
a lack of a strategic vision for development (or capacity to enforce a vision), could 
undermine the very mechanisms that lead to pro-poor growth in the long term.
The author would like to thank Professor Adil Najam and Cynthia Barakatt of  the Pardee 
Center as well as Professor Ann Helwege of  the International Relations Department at 
Boston University for their guidance and editing assistance.
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GlOSSARy
AEZ: Agro-ecological zone
CoC: Code of conduct
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI: Foreign direct investment
FIAS: Foreign Investment Advisory Service
IIASA: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
IIED: International Institute for Environment and Development
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC: International Finance Corporation
INGO: International non-governmental organization
ODA: Official development assistance
RNF: Rural non-farm
TNC: Transnational corporation
SWF: Sovereign wealth fund
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“Buy land—they’re not making it anymore.”
—Mark Twain
The last few years have seen a media frenzy surrounding the issue that is 
being referred to as the “global land rush” or “global land grab.” Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is being channeled into developing states at unprec-
edented rates for the purpose of transforming arable land into profitable 
and more productive agricultural enterprises for food and agrofuel stock.1 In 
2009 alone, 45 million hectares worth of large-scale farmland deals (approx-
imately the size of Spain) were announced before the year came to a close 
(World Bank 2010). The phenomenon features all the dramatic elements 
of a fascinating news story: big investors from rich nations acquiring or 
leasing vast tracts of sovereign land belonging to the poor and transactions 
shrouded in secrecy. Approximately 236 feature stories on land conces-
sions appeared in the international press between August 2008 and April 
2010 (Friis and Reenberg 2010). Good copy aside, there is a reason that the 
spotlight is falling on this trend: it is quickly changing the global political 
economy of land.
CONTexT fOR The “wiN-wiN” SCeNARiO 
Nearly half of humanity lives in rural areas and an estimated 2.5 of those 
three billion rural inhabitants are involved in agriculture (World Bank 
2008). With few exceptions, no country has been able to sustain rapid 
transition out of poverty without raising productivity in its agricultural 
sector (Timmer 2005). Public spending and official development assistance 
(ODA) to agriculture have been falling for years and there is no dispute 
that investment is needed to help farmers increase productivity in the face 
of stagnating yields, low resilience to climate disturbances, and fractured 
access to credit and food markets. This is especially true for subsistence and 
small-scale farmers in Africa who were bypassed by the benefits of the Green 
1. The term agrofuel is used to distinguish highly capitalized, large-scale, first-generation biofuel projects 
typified by monoculture and often requiring inputs such as synthetic fertilizer and pesticides to yield 
cost-competitive harvests. These include fuel crops such as maize, corn, oil palm, soya, sugar cane, sugar 
beet, oilseed rape, canola, and jatropha.
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Revolution that helped many farmers throughout Latin America and Asia 
improve their productivity in the latter half of the 20th century. 
By 2005–2007, it seemed that increasing FDI might be filling this resource 
gap. FDI flows to global agriculture had tripled from early 1990s levels of 
less than U.S. $1 billion per year to $3 billion annually (World Bank 2008). 
Institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations’ Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) were—and seem to remain—cautiously 
optimistic about the intensity of this revived interest, maintaining that, if 
executed responsibly, these investments would result in a “win-win” scenario 
for both investors and target states. Spillover effects like technology transfer 
and increased labor would jumpstart agricultural productivity and serve as 
an engine for economic development generating a tide to lift all boats. 
However, critics generally believe that these benefits will not materialize 
and claim that from a human rights perspective, these deals will actually 
result in more harm than good. This is the concern especially in places were 
land rights are historically contentious or weak, allowing governments to 
redistribute land as they see fit, leaving many people displaced and without 
recourse. The concern is that even if there are intentions on behalf of the 
target state or investors to compensate those on the losing end of these land 
transfers, the momentum of these deals is outpacing target states’ capabili-
ties to handle them; many do not have the legal infrastructure and lack 
other sufficient mechanisms to protect or even assess local livelihoods and 
welfare (Cotula and Vermeulen et al. 2009). If this is indeed the case, it also 
would be difficult for target states to enforce the provisions of these deals to 
ensure that they contribute to a positive longer-term vision of agricultural 
development. If the fabric of local economies is not strengthened as a result 
of these transactions, the harshest critics would be validated in their fears: 
These concessions amount to little more than a large-scale resource transfer 
from the poor to the rich. 
So who is right?
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ChAlleNGeS iN The fielD
Two factors make it difficult to study land transfers systematically or to 
make sweeping generalizations about their impacts: lack of data and the 
diversity of projects.
lack of Reliable Data 
Neither states nor investors are required to report the status or provisions of 
these deals, nor is there a central registry cataloging them as they happen. 
In addition to the variation resulting from heterogeneous registry require-
ments and procedures among and within states, lack of resources and effort 
put into collecting and sharing information can result in inconsistencies 
and large data gaps. For example, a now seriously troubled agrofuel project 
undertaken by the German company Flora EcoPower on land adjacent to 
elephant sanctuary in Ethiopia was reported by Reuters to involve 13,000 
hectares while only 3,800 hectares are registered with the Ethiopian Invest-
ment Agency (Cotula and Vermeulen et al. 2009).
Lack of disclosure through official channels or a central registry also means 
that land transfer incidence is to a large extent gleaned from the media, 
further compounding accuracy issues. Ideally, field researchers can corrobo-
rate media stories, but this is not always possible and propagating misinfor-
mation becomes a real danger. For example, media reports may allege that 
investors have acquired land in a foreign country when what actually hap-
pened was a team of surveyors visited with an intention to eventually invest. 
This has engendered suspicion that land transfers are over-reported. On 
the other hand, many land deals lack transparency and may not be offi-
cially recorded at all. This may be because customary procedure in the host 
country does not dictate that details be shared with a wider community of 
stakeholders or they may be deliberately obscured given their highly political 
nature. For example, an alleged 400,000-hectare deal in Sudan was reported 
in the media but was missing from the Sudanese government’s official public 
statistics (Cotula and Vermeulen et al. 2009).
Does this mean we can we infer that for every transfer that is exaggerated 
or falsely represented in the media, one more went completely unreported? 
6    The Pardee Papers | No. 13 | May 2011  
Accurate and complete data will remain elusive until countries develop more 
systematic methods of tracking land parcels as they change hands or, just as 
importantly, become willing to share them.
Project Diversity 
No two land deals are alike and potential impacts must be considered with 
this in mind. Results will vary depending on a wide range of variables 
encompassing governance, the socioeconomic characteristics of affected 
communities, geophysical fea-
tures of the lands they occupy, 
and the commercial structure 
of the agricultural project itself. 
For example, partnerships that 
include secure contracts provid-
ing for the sharing of risks and 
returns among all stakeholders 
will surely have a dramatically 
different outcome than a foreign firm importing both workers and seeds 
to work cheaply-leased, tax-free land only to directly repatriate both crop 
and profit. In addition, each concession has its own historical and cultural 
context that might include long-standing tensions over land ownership 
in post-colonial societies or current struggles associated with land rights 
reform. These singular circumstances imply that to fully characterize what 
is happening, a depth of information is required in order to complement 
global surveys with local evidence. Thus, using existing data to scale up or 
down for prescriptive purposes becomes a scientifically challenging process. 
Despite these data challenges, a significant and rising international effort 
is being made to integrate information on land acquisitions from a variety 
of sources including the FAO, farmers’ organizations, various international 
non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and think tanks, among others. 
The World Bank has issued an analysis of hundreds of land deals spanning 14 
countries in order to aggregate existing data and situate the phenomenon in 
the context of past land use and projected land expansion scenarios. In addi-
tion, more probing case studies are emerging through a series of publications by 
the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) as well 
Each concession has its own historical 
and cultural context that might include 
long-standing tensions over land 
ownership in post-colonial societies or 
current struggles associated with land 
rights reform.
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as through ethnographically grounded work by independent scholars. Early 
evidence suggests that critics are justified in many of their concerns regarding 
negative impacts on smallholders, farmers, and pastoralists. Despite this, many 
target states continue to provide incentives precisely for the purpose of attracting 
this type of FDI, marking the onset of a “race toward the bottom” (World Bank 
2010). This phrase, used by the World Bank itself to characterize the momen-
tum of these concessions, is especially poignant given that, as an institution, it 
has been a proponent of the “win-win” scenario—a rhetorically cautious propo-
nent with many caveats, but a proponent nonetheless. 
Using recent evidence, this paper examines the emerging political economy 
of the global land rush. The first section will provide an overview of the 
issues involved as well as discuss why certain states are being targeted over 
others. The following sections will explore how:
•  insecure tenure rights and poor governance are resulting in adverse 
effects in the short term that call into question whose notion of “devel-
opment” is being served through these concessions, and
•  ahistorical and naïve approaches in agricultural investment on behalf of 
foreign investors combined with a lack of a strategic vision for develop-
ment (or capacity to enforce a vision) could undermine the very mecha-
nisms that lead to pro-poor growth in the long term. 
Though land is acquired for purposes other than agriculture, this paper will 
specifically refer to concessions made for cultivating crops for food or agro-
fuels since these currently make up the bulk of the projects (by number if 
not in size). In addition, even though large-scale land concessions cannot be 
characterized completely through global North-South dynamics, this paper 
will exclusively focus on land transfers and leases that transpire between 
post-industrialized/transitional economies and developing states—many of 
which happen to have a colonial history.
The need to confront these issues is urgent: the destruction of farming 
structures is irreversible on the scale of one or several generations (Merlet 
and Jamart 2009). And with agricultural leases being signed for upwards of 
99 years, these concessions will have profound and lasting impacts on the 
development trajectories of target countries. 
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fOReiGN DiReCT iNveSTMeNT iN lAND: AN OveRview
Drivers
FDI in agriculture is not new, but until recently it has been considered 
mainly a commercial venture. This changed during the 2006–2008 global 
food crisis when nations suddenly realized the extent of their vulnerability 
in the face of volatile global food markets. Many could no longer afford to 
import staple grains and were not able to buffer the shock through domestic 
food supplies for various reasons. In a single year, food riots erupted in at 
least 30 countries from Senegal to Mexico. This arguably inspired finance-
rich countries to seek a new vision of food security—one that involved 
circumventing food markets altogether through acquiring or leasing foreign 
land and directly repatriating food supplies. 
Food security concerns are now a major factor driving these new invest-
ments in land. For example, Qatar, with only one percent of its land suitable 
for crops, has obtained 40,000 hectares in Kenya and has expanded its reach 
into Southeast Asia and Sudan for rice, oils, and grain production (Capital 
Business 2009). The United Arab Emirates, a country that imports 85 
percent of its food, acquired 324,000 hectares of farmland in the provinces 
of Sindh and Punjab, the breadbasket of Pakistan, in 2008 (Kerr and Bok 
2008). Perhaps the most infamous foreign land transfer to date is the failed 
deal between the South Korean group Daewoo Logistics and the govern-
ment of Madagascar. By purchasing land parcels in increments eventually 
constituting nearly half of Madagascar’s arable land, South Korea hoped to 
reduce its dependence on corn imports from the Americas. Protests from 
the Malagasy people fueled a growing civil unrest and led to the downfall 
of president Marc Ravalomanana by the time the deal was canceled in early 
2009 (Zigmo 2009). 
While foreign land is being sought to augment food supplies, commer-
cial opportunities in agriculture also have become attractive investments. 
Prospecting and speculation added to the volatility of the market in 2007 
when “soft” commodities, such as food crops, began outperforming hard 
commodities, such as raw materials, in the commodities investment market 
(Daniel and Mittal 2009). The fuel crisis, happening in conjunction with 
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the food crisis, spurred a rush of investments in agrofuels in anticipation 
of new renewable portfolio standards and policies, and land values jumped 
significantly. Farmland prices jumped by 16 percent in Brazil, 31 percent in 
Poland, and 15 percent in the Midwestern U.S. during the course of 2007 
alone (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). 
This overlapping of commercial investment opportunities with food and 
energy security has resulted in a mix of motivations for investment as shown 
in Figure 1.2
figure 1:  Share of intended or implemented investment Projects by 
Commodity
Source: Based on World Bank data collected from reports on the GRAIN website 
 October–August 2009. 
It also explains why there is such a diverse portfolio and combination of play-
ers when it comes to investments in foreign land for agricultural purposes. 
Land deals occur most commonly between private entities or in the form 
of public-private partnerships, though government-to-government transac-
tions have been known to occur. A number of investment banks have set 
2. Based on best available data. Distinguishing between plans for food and fuel is challenging as the same 
crop may be used for both or plans may evolve during the life of the project (Cotula and Vermeulen et 
al. 2009).
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up agricultural investment funds, including Deutsche Bank and U.S.-based 
BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley (Smaller and Mann 2009). 
Also involved are Gulf States’ sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). SWFs are state-
owned investment funds created mainly for the purpose of generating returns 
on foreign exchange surpluses. Some deals officially reported as originating in 
the private sector have varying degrees of sovereign backing or nebulous unof-
ficial government involvement. Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to find 
clear boundaries demarcating state from non-state enterprises as is the case 
with many Chinese firms (Cotula and Vermeulen et al. 2009). 
Even though the most recent global food crisis is over and prices have 
dropped considerably since the start of 2010, the cost of the typical food 
commodity basket is still nearly 70 percent higher than it was between 2002 
and 2004 (UN 2010). This is due to underlying structural factors consti-
tuted by a confluence of competing pressures on land. 
A rising population, especially a burgeoning global middle class, will be 
demanding more meat—a land-intensive source of protein. The agrofuel-
versus-food debate is likely to intensify with concerns over energy security 
and fluctuating fossil fuel costs. Though it is important to note that since 
the crisis many agrofuel projects ended up experiencing delays or have been 
shelved temporarily due to lower oil prices, the nascent global agrofuel 
complex continues to develop through the formation of new and increas-
ingly complex transnational corporate/state arrangements (Borras Jr. and 
McMichael et al. 2010; Dauvergne and Neville 2010). A mid-range sce-
nario approximates that by 2020, an additional 500 million hectares will be 
required to meet global agrofuel demands under current mandates (Galla-
gher 2008; Fischer 2008). 
Land is also being swallowed up by increased urbanization and is in demand 
for other industries such as tourism, forestry, and mining. This multitude of 
pressures will only increase with time, suggesting that, even though cyclical 
bear markets related to agricultural commodities may come and go, ever-
climbing prices will be the hallmark of the long-term trend (Walayat 2010). 
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where Are the Targets?
Africa hosted 70 percent of the demand for land between 2008 and 2009, 
with Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Mozambique accounting 
for more than 23 percent of projects worldwide (World Bank 2010). A 
recent study estimates that between 51 and 63 million hectares have been 
transferred in 27 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the last few years 
(Friis and Reenberg 2010). Africa is followed by Latin America ( Brazil 
and  Argentina), which hosted 21 percent of all project investment in 
2008–2009, Central Asia with 11 percent, and, finally, Southeast Asia with 
10 percent (World Bank 2010). In most cases these concessions constitute 
a fairly small fraction of total land in the host country, but the quality of 
that land is of paramount importance. Even smaller-scale deals that escape 
media attention may result in the transfer of the best farmland while leaving 
smallholders with land that is less productive, water stressed, or inaccessible 
to markets. The origins of the most active investors and some of the largest 
deals are featured in Figure 2. 
figure 2: Origin of Key Players and Select land Deals
Sources: ODDO Securities 2010; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; World Bank 
2010.
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Scrambling for land: “Suitability” versus “Availability” 
The possession of cultivable land is one factor that determines which 
countries are targeted for land deals, and a great amount of effort has been 
put into identifying the location of remaining suitable land to meet future 
food and agrofuel needs. Organizations such as the World Bank, FAO, and 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) have gener-
ated and refined tools using satellite imagery and other data that catego-
rize land appropriate for growing various crops into agro-ecological zones 
(AEZ) according to soil quality, rainfall, aspect, slope, etc. Socio-economic 
variables such as available technology and management practices can also 
contribute to determining the AEZ (albeit in a limited fashion due to 
the heterogeneity of available data) and applied to find desirable places to 
expand cropland based on low population densities, proximity to roads, and 
existing irrigation infrastructure. The amount of the remaining arable land 
that is uncultivated, not forested, and with population densities less than 
25 persons per square kilometer that could be dedicated to the five rain-fed 
crops of sugarcane, wheat, maize, oil palm, and soybean is estimated to be 
roughly 445 million hectares (World Bank 2010). Over half of this land can 
be found in 10 countries and, in turn, half of these are in Africa, making 
Sub-Saharan Africa one of the last places on Earth where many countries 
have a low population-to-fertile land ratio (World Bank 2010). Whether the 
development of this land is cost-effective is another question since much of 
it is located more than six hours from a market (Figure 3).
These data attempt to quantify how much land could potentially be used 
for certain crops but are not able to reflect who might be using the land 
and, in many cases, for what purpose. Thus the terms “suitable” and “avail-
able” are not necessarily interchangeable. Moderate resolution satellite 
imagery can be used to determine if land is generally cultivated, but unless 
finer resolution imaging or other types of complementary data are available 
and systematically integrated into policy decisions, broad statements about 
land availability cannot reasonably be made with the amount of public con-
fidence and alacrity we have seen recently.
For example, the government of Mozambique has stated that only approxi-
mately nine percent of the county’s arable land is currently in use (Cotula 
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and Dyer et al. 2008), while in Indonesia, the Department of Agriculture 
reports that approximately 27 million hectares of “unproductive forestlands” 
are open to be offered to investors (Colchester and Jiwan et al. 2006). In 
2009, Reuters quoted the Zambian Agricultural Minister saying that Zam-
bia was using less than 15 percent of its land and that more than 30 mil-
lion hectares were “begging to be utilised [sic]” (Tostevin 2009). The 2010 
Annual World Bank Conference on Land Administration and Policy seemed 
to serve as much as a platform for many states’ representatives to advertise 
the availability of cultivable land (while downplaying social and environ-
mental assessments) as a discussion of some of the major concerns with the 
scale and speed of recent land transfers.
These claims become problematic in light of the fact that many countries 
attracting investment have not done due diligence in investigating who is 
figure 3:  Potential Supply of land for Rainfed Cultivation  
(pop. density< 25 persons/km2)
Source: Adapted from World Bank 2010.
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using the land that they are offering, mainly because of weak institutional 
capacity and a lack of resources. In Zambia, for example, land informa-
tion is collected and maintained by multiple authorities all using different 
“formats, scales, accuracy, and extent” without proper indexing or storage 
conditions (World Bank 2010). The World Bank found that poor man-
agement of land information 
has resulted in an “astonishing 
lack of knowledge on behalf of 
land agencies and governments 
as to what is going on within 
their own borders” (World Bank 
2010). Satellite images used to 
monitor investor projects on land 
acquired in Mozambique reveal 
overlaps with already-titled community areas. Countries may be prema-
turely putting land on the auction block, perpetuating the myth of terra 
nullius—a  convenient colonizing notion that underdeveloped land is unused 
or unowned (Wiley 2010). This could lead not only to embitterment and 
contention threatening the profitability of the intended agricultural venture, 
but also potentially result in violent conflict.
what About “Marginal lands”? 
The gravity of allocating cultivable land that may or may not be in use by other 
groups becomes even greater when land concessions are made in places that are 
already food insecure. For example, targets such as Sudan, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Zambia all have a prevalence 
of undernourishment between 22 percent and 69 percent (FAOSTAT 2010). 
Agrofuel projects have especially been under scrutiny, since cultivating oil crops 
to feed mostly Western countries’ consumption habits can be considered unethi-
cal undertakings within hungry countries. If demand for agrofuels is to be met, 
however, some sort of expansion will be necessary since the countries that use 
the most fuel cannot reasonably fulfill mandates through domestic production. 
For example, the EU has committed to raising the contribution of agrofuels to 
their fuel mix to 10 percent by 2020, and companies have already laid claim to 
more than five million hectares of land across the global South in order to meet 
The World Bank found that poor 
management of land information has 
resulted in an “astonishing lack of 
knowledge on behalf of land agencies 
and governments as to what is going 
on within their own borders.”
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this objective (Borras Jr. and McMichael et al. 2010). These mandates, com-
bined with the pressure of rising costs and thinner margins within the agricul-
tural and energy industry, have contributed to the creation of an emergent and 
powerful “biofuel complex” (Borras Jr. and McMichael et al. 2010). 
With the growth of this complex, the concept of “marginal land” has emerged 
as a term commonly associated with the promotion of agrofuels. Marginal 
lands are defined as areas unsuitable for cost-competitive food crop cultiva-
tion, so classifying land as “marginal” effectively circumvents the more divisive 
questions surrounding the food-versus-fuel debate. One of the problems with 
this term (and others like “degraded,” “idle,” or “wasteland”) is that it lacks 
a systematic definition, so it can be unclear what is meant when the term 
is used, especially in a politicized context. Another issue is that the people 
already utilizing these lands often have intentions behind land use patterns in 
agriculture that are not easily discerned from the remote methods being used 
to identify them, namely satellite imagery and remote sensing.
For example, land described as “idle” or “abandoned” through remote 
methods may have purposefully been taken out of rotation to fallow, left by 
pastoralists to regenerate, or specifically dedicated to secondary growth for-
est. In places where the average smallholder farm is only one or two hectares 
in size, land parcels dedicated to subsistence farming are too small to be 
detected by most satellite imagery and may be tagged as “marginal” when, in 
reality, they are supporting households through mixed food crops, biomass 
for cooking, building materials, and providing foraged food products such 
as fruits and nuts (Sugrue 2008). One study documented agrofuel crops in 
India planted on what had been deemed “wasteland” though communities 
were already using this land for a variety of purposes (Rajagopal 2007). 
For these reasons, care should be taken in co-opting language from global stud-
ies and making the leap into prescriptive inferences. Using the notional language 
of global models in a political narrative can give a false sense that these land clas-
sifications are ontological and have provided a foolproof tool by which invest-
ments can be ethically sanctioned. Just as it cannot be inferred from these labels 
that these lands are not already claimed, it cannot be assumed that these parcels 
lack value outside of their potential for competitive agriculture or that agrofuel 
companies should have carte blanche for developing them. 
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“Good investment Climates”
Perceived land availability is not the only feature that is drawing investor interest 
to host states. In the absence of formal and/or well-functioning land markets, 
undervaluation of land is common. Land in Mozambique is selling for as little 
as U.S. $1/hectare (Deininger 2010). In Peru, where foreigners can own land 
outright, the going government price has been on a downward trend from U.S. 
$3,400/hectare in 1997 to $300/hectare today (Hernandez 2010).
“Good investment climates” are also being created through restructuring. 
The Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) and the World Bank, 
along with its private arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
help countries systematically remove investor-identified barriers. For 
example, the goal of the new FIAS “Land Market” product is to address 
the common complaints investors have about the difficulties in accessing 
and securing land in many developing countries as well as the effort, time, 
and money that goes into obtaining permits for land development (Daniel 
and Mittal 2010). In addition to obtaining FIAS assistance in streamlin-
ing administrative procedures, special or “near-term” arrangements are also 
made for the sake of investors that include decrees of land tenure security 
or extended lease periods that have not necessarily been afforded domestic 
smallholders (Daniel and Mittal 2010). In Pakistan, investing firms enjoy 
tax breaks for 10 years, retain 100 percent of the profits, and are permitted 
to repatriate all that is produced to their home country (Mustafa 2008). 
These conditions hold even in the case of an acute food deficit, even though 
nearly half of all Pakistanis are estimated to live in some state of food inse-
curity (World Food Programme 2010). 
This type of restructuring followed on the heels of results released from 
an FIAS-administered survey in which 79 percent of investor participants 
identified land acquisition and site development regulation as the most 
significant barrier to investment in Pakistan. Investment authorities on the 
regional or provincial level are also being set up in some states to speedily 
deal with investments and transaction costs. In some cases these investment 
authorities are also responsible for identifying available land to provide to 
investors. How these lands are officially identified is largely unknown. 
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Up-front incentives like tax breaks, low transaction costs, and 100-percent 
profit repatriation certainly attract attention, but the determinants of a smart 
agricultural investment are hardly constituted by the carrots alone. Investors will 
be operating within norms and laws unique to the host country, and there are 
many agro-environmental, structural, and institutional factors that will impact 
the success of the venture. From a simple risk perspective, the following precon-
ditions would be essential in facilitating a positive outcome for investors:
•  Recognition of property rights. Clearly delineated and legally protected 
property rights should simplify land transfers and reduce transaction 
costs as well as offer protection when investors in turn become the own-
ers or lessees of the land. 
•  Good governance. Governance measures are composed of  indicators that 
take into account voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and government effectiveness 
in the host country (Kaufman and Kraay et al. 2009). 
figure 4a: Tenure Ranking of Countries frequently hosting land Deals
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Surprisingly, we still see many of the countries targeted for investments ranked 
poorly on property rights protection and governance (Figures 4a and 4b).3 
Many of them are also poorly scored on the World Bank/IFC’s “Ease of Doing 
 Business Index,” which ranks countries using indicators such the ability to 
enforce contracts and protect investments, and the ease of registering property 
(World Bank/IFC 2010). GRAIN, a Spain-based NGO that has been outspo-
ken in its opposition to “land grabs,” has interpreted this result to mean that 
investors are targeting states where it is relatively easy to gain control over others’ 
land (GRAIN 2010). Even if this is not the primary motivation in all cases, the 
result does suggest that a new type of risk assessment seems to be prevailing—
3. Providing one average score from six separate components of governance provides a less nuanced 
picture of the specific dimensions of governance within a country: two states could receive the same aver-
age score though one may rank highly on half of the indicators and poorly on the other half, while the 
second country has middling scores for all dimensions, for example.
figure 4b: Average Governance Scores of Countries frequently hosting land Deals 
Sources: Adapted from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Massimo 2009; ODDO Securities 2010; 
USAID/Ard, Inc. 2008; World Bank 2010. 
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one in which the perceived long-term benefits of dealing with obtuse laws and 
inept, ineffective institutions are worth the effort.
Though weak states may provide opportunities for investors to coax a win 
out of resource transfers under unstable conditions, the same cannot be said 
for the landless and current small landholders. Those without recognized 
land rights and good governance to protect those rights are the most vulner-
able to displacement—with a real possibility of seeing no benefits at all. 
whOSe DevelOPMeNT? eviDeNCe fROM The fRONT
The Role of Property Rights and Governance
Roughly one-sixth of human beings live with precarious situations in which 
their land is subject to customary or community control—neither formally 
acknowledged nor respected under the law (Merlet and Jamart 2009). Even 
if property ownership (collective or otherwise) is officially acknowledged, 
this does not mean that rights are necessarily secure. For example, in many 
countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, landholders run the risk of los-
ing land to the state itself. Ghana’s constitution allows the government to 
acquire land “for the public good” if it deems the land is better suited to 
be leased to another user. In Indonesia, approximately 70 percent of the 
country’s land area is classified as “forest estate,” which falls under the juris-
diction of the state’s Forest Department and can be conceded to investors 
though there may be people living on the land (World Bank 2010).
When governments in target states with unrecognized tenure rights and/
or weak governance decide to redistribute land, often it is through “quasi-
official” judicial processes adopted more for the sake of investors than local 
people (World Bank 2010). For example, communities may be alerted to 
the possibility of losing their land by public notice. When Sun Biofuels (a 
UK-based company) was seeking to expand operations in Tanzania, allo-
cated land was to be published in the local newspaper prior to the Presi-
dent’s assent to allow for contestation. Not only was the allocated land 
published after being officially approved, but the market price for the land 
was not factored into the compensation package for the villagers, who only 
received money for the lost crops (Deininger 2010). In Sudan, land claims 
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must be raised within two weeks or the local government authority will 
decide the land is “free of rights,” liberating that land parcel for investors 
(World Bank 2010). 
There have been cases reported where any semblance of stakeholder involve-
ment is neglected. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, if processing 
a concession application takes more than six months, the regional authority 
can grant occupancy rights to the investor as requested in the application, 
even if no work has been done to identify stakeholders (World Bank 2010). 
In some cases, if the government decides to reclaim the land for redistribu-
tion, landholders may be forcefully evicted. When the Tanzanian govern-
ment wanted to lease land parcels already in use, widespread arson ensued, 
leaving 800 people homeless. More than 100,000 livestock were left without 
water and pasture, and a villager was reportedly raped by riot police working 
on behalf of the government (Tandon 2010). 
Even if they manage to hold onto the land in title, landholders lose both 
influence over how their land is appropriated and bargaining power when 
negotiating for compensation (if indeed any is offered) because of tenure 
insecurity. This is especially true for those who may be only indirectly (but 
not necessarily insignificantly) affected (Deininger 2010). Female-headed 
households are especially vulnerable since women’s formal rights to land are 
usually tentative at best and their voices go unheard even though they may 
be the majority in their communities (Tandon 2010). Any power they do 
have tends to shift to men as land gains in commercial value (Cotula and 
Vermeulen et al. 2009). 
Living under rule of ineffective governance compounds problems associated 
with weak tenure as legal recourse for compensation may be out of reach for 
the common landholder. In states like Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania, 
affordable options exist to record, delimit, and upgrade group tenure but are 
difficult to access (Deininger 2010). In other states, a clear transfer mecha-
nism of rights may exist but there is no representation for landholders as in 
the case of both Mozambique and Indonesia (Deininger 2010). 
The World Bank and others are concerned that even if investors are not 
directly participating in the more egregious abuses by targeting states that 
The Global Land Rush   21
have weak governance and unrecognized/poorly protected property rights, 
they are complicit in any harm that may result. In response to these con-
cerns, the FAO, World Bank, and other international organizations and 
civil society groups have been promoting the adoption of a code of conduct 
(CoC) to provide a guiding set of principles for investors. There has been a 
general lack of urgency on the issue as the UN Committee on Food Security 
failed to sanction a set of guiding principles put forth by the World Bank 
in October 2010 (Aloisi 2010). Though some variation of a non-binding 
CoC will most likely be adopted in the coming year, the potential of a vague 
set of rules to serve a function beyond lip service is still being debated, and 
many believe that it will merely amount to a rubber stamp to continue with 
land transfers—business as usual.
The Role of Power and intrastate hegemony 
The media has played a major role in sparking debate over these large-scale 
land deals by bringing human rights abuses and reports of displacement into 
the international spotlight. Though this may be considered a positive contri-
bution as it brings attention to an important issue, the subtle dramatizing or 
perfunctory treatment of players and motivations surrounding these invest-
ments does nothing to encourage the development of a more robust and 
nuanced picture of what is actually happening on the ground. For example, 
portraying “local communities” and investors in a David-versus-Goliath-like 
struggle gives the impression that there are two sets of interests: those of 
the investors and those of a homogenous stakeholder group of landowners 
with similar interests that comprise a “local community.” This worldview 
belies the messy nature of land relations, however, glossing over the fact that 
these communities are separate and distinct groups with different amounts 
of power and competing agendas. Fuller characterizations of these intrastate 
power dynamics are needed in order to understand which groups may be 
benefiting over others and why.
After being approved by the central government, the power to effectively 
broker these land transfers is commonly delegated to the regional or pro-
vincial land agencies and investment authorities. For example, Ethiopian 
regional investment authorities have the power to sanction concessions 
below 5,000 hectares without consulting other agencies (World Bank 2010). 
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Under this emergent trend of decentralization, there is a strong possibility 
that land appropriation decisions would be influenced by provincial politics, 
considering that agrarian settings also happen to be where the political and 
economic power of landed elites is the most entrenched (Borras and Franco 
2010). If endemic power structures are biased to further empower elites 
through already established legal, “quasi-official,” or institutional mecha-
nisms at the expense of others, even a well-intentioned investor would be 
unable to ensure an entirely just process. It is simply out of their purview. A 
good first step would be to investigate who is actually capturing the rents of 
these undervalued lands to establish to what extent an inflow of FDI to the 
sector serves as merely a vehicle to reinforce already established hegemony at 
the provincial or regional levels.
Though redistributing resources along already existing lines of power does 
not necessarily imply any wrongdoing, there have been reports of illegal or 
extra-legal incidents that suggest abuses of power on behalf of investors as 
well as various interest groups within the target states themselves. Land is an 
extremely valuable asset in developing states (typically accounting for 30 to 50 
percent of national wealth), making the land sector particularly susceptible to 
corruption and rent-seeking (Kunte and Hamilton et al. 1998). In the Philip-
pines and other parts of Asia, there have been reports of intimidation and 
harassment of local farmers by speculators and local agents working on behalf 
or palm oil agribusiness investors (Montemeyer 2009). In southern Sudan, 
there have been agreements between politically well-connected individuals 
and American companies that are “not really following any law” (Zarro 2010). 
Even if these incidents are the exception as opposed to the rule, they beg the 
question: what is a “land grab” versus concession? Does the former refer to 
land obtained illegally, with the latter characterized by a mere asymmetry of 
power and information between actors? If yes, can a concession also be under-
stood in the context of a resource transfer between social and economic classes 
within the target state itself or only applied to describe a transaction occurring 
between investors originating from two sovereign states?
The Role of the State
And what of state interests? A joint IIED—FAO—IFAD study of land 
transfers in five African countries found that fees and direct monetary 
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transfers are not the main host country benefit (Cotula and Vermeulen et al. 
2009). Investment, rather, is the key and the hope that struggling agricul-
tural sectors can be more critically linked to agricultural export markets. 
However, restructuring (as it currently is being done) can seem antithetical 
to both smallholder and local government interests. For example, one local 
benefit generated by land concessions is higher tax revenue; yet centrally 
decreed tax breaks for investors may prevent provincial governments from 
collecting revenue, subsequently reducing the ability and incentive of local 
governments to provide complementary public goods (World Bank 2010). 
This may imply that there is a concept of “development” that supersedes a 
concern for strengthening local economies or one based on an understand-
ing that even though an inevitable reshuffling of winners and losers will 
result, some concessions are necessary to secure the long-term investment.
Assessing the validity of this approach is complicated. Linking short-term 
impacts of land concessions to long-term effects on poverty alleviation in a 
causal relationship is difficult. This is the case not only because of time lags, but 
also because isolating the effects of these agricultural investments from other 
confounding influences on the economy is challenging. Still, local buy-in is 
essential if investments are going to succeed in the long run, so national and 
local interests should not be decoupled. Since most  concessions must be initially 
sanctioned at the central level before being passed to local and regional authori-
ties, the state also plays a pivotal role in making sure that investors and projects 
are chosen based on their alignment with a concrete vision for national develop-
ment and not chosen along the lines of “any investment is good investment.” 
Unfortunately, this is not what seems to be happening. 
Though many countries have formal national objectives for development, 
the World Bank notes that many lack specific guidelines for choosing 
among projects. It is common to have only vague criteria in evaluating proj-
ects such as “job creation” or “improved productivity” (World Bank 2010). 
Alternatives remain unexplored and priorities are being set ad hoc in a 
response to investor demands rather than linked to cohesive host-state plans 
for growth upfront (World Bank 2010). Poor vision (or lack of resources 
to implement any cogent vision) leaves opportunities for inexperienced 
and possibly predatory investors and precludes local buy-in as smallholders 
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are less likely to lend support to ill-conceived projects. It also potentially 
undermines the very mechanisms that lead to pro-poor development such as 
employment generation and diversification of the rural economy. 
RiSKS TO lONG-TeRM PRO-POOR DevelOPMeNT
investor Naïveté
Speculation and special arrangements such as tax breaks for investors may 
attract attention, but a lack of legal and institutional architecture to facilitate 
implementation and verify assets may deter solvent and experienced inves-
tors. Agricultural enterprises already are generally considered to be high-risk 
ventures and often the target state does not have the ability or political will to 
properly vet the investors or enforce contracts if the investors decide they are 
either “in over their heads” or finds the business terrain more difficult than 
expected. In many cases financial information is checked perfunctorily (if 
checked at all) and not available to parties outside those negotiating the deal 
(World Bank 2010). If the project fails, this becomes a loss on both fronts: If 
the host state cannot attract capable investors, nobody wins. 
Target states need better mechanisms to ensure that investors are solvent, 
especially if they are going to attempt to develop leased lands for agrofuel 
crops where best practices have not been thoroughly researched. The Ethio-
pian government has prepared some 23.3 million hectares for the purpose 
of agrofuel projects, but potential investors are required to provide very few 
details regarding the investment 
capital—an oversight that may 
have already resulted in tremen-
dous loss (MELCA Mahiber 
2008; Yewondwossen 2010). For 
example, the German company 
Flora EcoPower cleared vast tracts 
of controversial land adjacent 
to an elephant sanctuary in the 
Oromia region of Ethiopia for the purpose of cultivating a castor bean plan-
tation. The project ended up in crisis, ultimately collapsing in the spring 
of 2010 when the company was not able to pay its debts to suppliers or its 
Target states need better mechanisms 
to ensure that investors are solvent, 
especially if they are going to attempt 
to develop leased lands for agrofuel 
crops where best practices have not 
been thoroughly researched.
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employees (Sisay 2010). Flora EcoPower was the largest agrofuel company 
operating in Ethiopia—yet it exported its product only three times during 
its period of operation (Yewondwossen 2010). After facing an uncertain 
future in Ethiopia, the company has announced plans to reopen and will 
apparently settle its debts of $2.5 million, but the experience is one to learn 
from (Yewondwossen 2010). These risks do not only apply to agrofuel 
projects, either. In Liberia, a rice investor reneged on his agreement with 
the government and decided to start cultivating wetlands when he failed at 
developing the less fertile land originally conceded to him, displacing 1,000 
farmers in the process (World Bank 2010).
There may be no way to ensure that a situation such as the one that beset 
Flora EcoPower will not happen from time to time or that all investors will 
respect the terms of their agreements. There are, however, regulations that 
could reduce the risk of attracting ill-prepared investors. In Peru, where it is 
legal for foreigners to own land outright, a large percentage of the purchase 
price and anticipated future returns must be deposited as soon as a bid is 
made, which seems to be an effective screening mechanism (World Bank 
2010). Mechanisms like this could also screen out investors that might 
dishonor agreements, lessening the burden of monitoring and enforcement 
for poorer countries. 
investor inflexibility 
Even solvent and experienced investors cannot be guaranteed a successful 
project. Cultural conditions and the local business landscape in the host 
country will influence the way the agricultural sector functions and must 
be considered. There are complex sentiments and relationships surrounding 
land in target countries. Not only is land an emotive asset class inexorably 
linked to identity and culture, it is a politically sensitive asset as well since 
many states have been struggling for land rights reform for years. Individu-
als may be linked to their communities and specific parcels of land through 
long-standing feuds, unspoken agreements, and symbiotic relationships—
histories a foreigner is unlikely to know anything about. Though many 
states are transitioning away from a sentimental view of land to a more west-
ernized, utilitarian view, the coming together of these distinct viewpoints 
can breed resentment, misunderstanding, and false expectations. Investors 
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need to understand that there is no such thing as an apolitical land acquisi-
tion in post-colonial and post-conflict societies. 
Preconceived notions regarding which business models are best suited to the 
economy of the localities is also an issue. For example, most conceded land 
currently is destined to be managed as a large, corporate venture falling under 
the umbrella term of “agro-industry.” Agro-industry, or agribusiness, describes 
all enterprises and supply chains involved in developing agricultural products 
from farm to fork, and often involves heavily capitalized transnational corpo-
rations (TNCs). Bigness and the elusive quest for economies of scale in the 
agricultural sector are not virtues that have taken hold in many countries; this 
is true especially for those that have historically relied on small-scale agricul-
ture. Reconciling these two approaches is paramount for long-term success, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even though most landholders would appre-
ciate the influx of capital, “the African small-scale farmer does not feature on 
the commercial farming radar”—the unstated assumption being that the land 
itself should be the limit to African input (Makunike 2009). This ignorance 
about the history of farming practices and adherence to a particular paradigm 
of commercial farming that is dismissive of local methods are major obstacles 
to gaining local buy-in. Given that the IFC intends to increase lending to agri-
business by up to 30 percent over the next few years, this will be an important 
topic to address (Blas 2009).
Lack of smallholder support is certainly a threat to the success of a ven-
ture in the short-term, but there are also long-term ramifications for hasty 
investors and host states that either do not or cannot exercise discernment 
when it comes to the nature of these land deals. If projects do not coincide 
with a solidly founded development strategy, countries may end up with a 
fragmented agricultural system or one that has failed to provide the touted 
“win-win” benefit of employment creation. In both cases, it is unlikely that 
the host country will see the type of rural diversification that is necessary for 
poverty alleviation.
employment effects 
Increased employment is one of the positive benefits of these investments. 
The World Bank cites that communities in surveyed countries were very 
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appreciative of the employment generated by investments, and that they 
believed that such employment “contributes to their well-being” (Word 
Bank 2010). The report also mentions a project in the Ukraine where one 
firm is paying nearly 5,000 new local employees one-and-a-half times the 
average wage. This is an undisputed benefit for those who have been hired, 
but the entire distribution of winners and losers needs to be taken into 
consideration. The type of jobs that will be available in association with a 
new investment may only benefit those with a particular skill set, and some 
people who lost land access may not be hired. For this reason, provisions 
that include increased employment cannot necessarily be considered an 
adequate trade-off for conceded land. And, of course, there is no guarantee 
that concession agreements will address local employment at all, and if they 
do, evidence indicates that they do so only vaguely (Cotula and Vermeulen 
2009). In some cases provisions may be addressed concretely but never real-
ized. For example, an agrofuel project in Mozambique employed only 65 or 
70 full-time and seasonal workers out of the 2,650 jobs that were promised 
in the original plan (World Bank 2010).
Some investments may actually reduce the number of jobs available as 
increased mechanization reduces the need for manual labor. Agrofuel 
projects almost always require heavily industrialized, large-scale, mono-
cropping methods (Borras and Franco 2010), and it appears that investors 
are targeting countries that are currently using less mechanized farming 
methods where they can achieve relatively quick productivity gains through 
importing machinery or employing newer technology (GRAIN 2010). A 
fully mechanized soy field will generally provide only 18 jobs per 1,000 
hectares in the Ukraine, and a mechanized grain field will support only 10 
(Deininger 2010). Sugar crops for ethanol worked manually provide 700 
jobs in contrast with mechanized crops, which only provide 150 (Deininger 
2010). It is also important to note that productivity improvements that may 
come with a mechanized model don’t automatically translate into improve-
ment in poverty alleviation. One can look to Brazil for evidence of this—
expansion into the cerrado (savannah) region was technically considered 
a success, but employment generation and impacts on rural poverty were 
limited (World Bank 2009). Between 1991 and 2001, China raised 400 
million people out of poverty based on a smallholder sector with an aver-
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age plot size of less than two hectares; Brazil achieved the same amount of 
growth using mechanized agriculture, but the number of rural poor actually 
increased (Songwe and Deininger 2009).
Agricultural Dualism and Rural Growth
Also of concern is that these large-scale industrialized models will eventually 
fragment rural communities into enclaves of highly advantaged commercial 
farms within a traditional smallholder agricultural sector (FAO 2009). For 
example, a major tenet of transnational corporations is vertical integration: 
moving upstream toward the production side in order to consolidate control 
over all processes from seed to final product. This allows businesses to avoid 
buying raw commodities on the market since these also include a share for 
traders—one that can be significant due to the hedging for fluctuations in the 
world market. This effectively cuts costs and edges out rivals, namely unsub-
sidized, smaller farmers who do not have the same resources. Where there is 
no functioning autonomous vision of development, a lack of spatial planning 
may further exacerbate the fragmentation of agricultural and ecological sys-
tems, potentially disrupting the mutually beneficial relationship between the 
rural farm sector and non-farm sector that is the key to poverty alleviation. 
Historically speaking, a prerequisite to poverty alleviation has been growth 
in the rural non-farm (RNF) sector. RNF growth depends on local wages 
rising enough to afford the goods that the RNF has to offer (Timmer 
2005). Rising agricultural-sector incomes contribute to this by increasing 
the demand for RNF-sector goods and, subsequently, rising wages in the 
RNF sector help drive the expansion of farms by allowing the purchase of 
more agricultural products (FAO 2003, World Bank 2010). This recipro-
cal relationship cannot work in a dualistic agricultural sector. Agricultural 
growth initially puts money into the hands of those who own land and if 
that money is spent on imports, repatriated, or otherwise not spent on local 
goods and services, the proper economic linkages cannot be created (FAO 
2003). In this way, it becomes clear that the assumption that increased pro-
ductivity automatically leads to poverty reduction is incorrect and that pro-
tecting jobs is a critical factor in poverty reduction—especially in situations 
where nonagricultural economic growth is insufficient to draw workers out 
of the agricultural sector (Songwe and Deininger 2009). These are particu-
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larly important considerations in Africa where, unlike the trajectory of rural 
development in China, the adoption of certain agricultural business models 
may only encourage farmers to leave rural communities without urban jobs 
and services to support them. 
Moreover, the notion that mass-scale agriculture is the only way to increase 
productivity, spur rural development, and provide enough food to keep pace 
with population growth is simply untrue. Proponents of the industrialized 
model can equate the “small farming is charming” attitude with denying 
development, but as we have seen, directing more FDI toward supporting 
smallholder agriculture is pragmatic, not ideological. Plenty of guidance 
and case studies are available documenting well-integrated models that are 
both productive and have worked well for local farmers and investors alike. 
What’s more, they will be less likely to foster a dualistic agricultural system. 
As the World Bank notes, for land-abundant countries, now is the time to 
choose between an agricultural sector founded on “broad-based ownership 
and medium-sized farms or a dual structure where a few mega farms coexist 
with many smallholder producers” (World Bank 2010). This sheds a whole 
new light on the seriousness of conceding land parcels for 99 years with 
minimal knowledge of or control over what is happening on that land.
Settling the Debate: Key issues 
Increased FDI is bringing much-needed resources into the agricultural sectors 
of target states, yet all of the elements of the World Bank’s “good policy recom-
mendations” in regard to land acquisitions are currently missing: deals are non-
transparent, include vague or no provisions for the host state, and frequently 
occur in countries with weak governance and unrecognized property rights. Not 
enough consideration is given to local history and farming expertise. Thorough 
economic, social, and environmental impact assessments are rarely performed.  
The continuing intellectual debate seems to hinge on projecting longer-term 
impacts on poverty alleviation based solely on an amalgamation of observa-
tions of short-term effects from around the world. Much of the data that we 
do have is derived from research projects that span some months (if that) and 
reflect only select cases. The depth of information to adequately characterize 
the potential of indirect linkages isn’t available at this point. Whichever side of 
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the “win-win” scenario one happens to align with, examples that reinforce that 
view are plentiful. For example, for every case in which one might find small-
holders being displaced without compensation, one can certainly find a case 
in which certain households benefit from more employment opportunities.
So how do we choose the appropriate approach for framing large-scale land 
concessions in the modern era? The phenomenon has all the hallmarks of a 
“globalized” issue: it cuts across multiple disciplines and scales. The bur-
geoning agrofuel complex is characterized by highly mobile capital moving 
through an increasingly intricate web of “North-South-South” linkages or 
“triangular” projects involving multinational corporations, states, and pri-
vate actors (Dauvergne and Neville 2010) that seems to render the nation-
state an antiquated concept. With the push of the FIAS and IFC on host 
states to take stock of land ownership and create special property arrange-
ments for investors, land reform seems to be imposed from the outside 
rather than through the sovereign state. In this light, a political economy 
approach seems like a good place to start—moving through scales from the 
local to the global asking the important questions: Who owns what? Who 
does what? Who gets what? And finally, what do they do with the surplus 
wealth? (Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 2010). 
Transparency is the key. The process by which land is identified and allot-
ted to investors must be made clear. For example, by 2013, Ethiopia plans 
to lease three million hectares of land that the government claims to be idle 
(Rice 2010). Experts claim that there is no such thing as idle land in Ethio-
pia, let alone anywhere else in Africa (Daniel and Mittal 2010). States need 
to be transparent about their methodology in arriving at this conclusion and 
how cadastral information—that 
is, information from an official 
land registry—is reflected in these 
assessments, if at all. Researchers 
need to follow suit by making a 
greater effort to explicitly discern 
between the land classifications that are used now so colloquially, including 
“degraded,” “idle,” “sleeping,” “waste” and “marginal.” Is degraded land only a 
physical term? Is marginal land always an economic term? Even if it seems out 
Transparency is the key. The process 
by which land is identified and allotted 
to investors must be made clear.
The Global Land Rush   31
of the scientific purview of the work, studies using only biophysical data to 
classify land should stress this fact since results may have real policy implica-
tions and may influence investor decision-making. 
Moreover, the concept of land suitability needs to be expanded to include 
information about tenure status, as this is an important step in identifying 
populations at risk for displacement. Participatory mapping projects can 
further help to identify where people might be more vulnerable to resource 
loss, conflict, and environmental damage. Having tools that include cadas-
tral information would also serve investors as cultural and political outsiders 
to gain local buy-in and increase the chances of project success. 
These concessions also need to be documented as they happen. The estab-
lishment of a central registry that catalogs concessions and tracks the status 
on provisions serves three purposes: 
1) It helps resource-strapped states share the burden of monitoring 
investor activities. 
2) It contributes to the assessment of overall trends and serves as a 
baseline to start making links between investments and multiplier 
effects.
3) It serves as a “watchdog” for investor behavior. Some investors may 
have noble intentions, but with the momentum of these deals it is 
unlikely that an investor CoC will be enough to totally deter unethical 
opportunistic behavior as privileged TNCs and investor conglomerates 
continue to colonize vast tracts of farmland the world over. 
Ultimately, states need help not only with monitoring and enforcing provi-
sions but also in making more stringent demands in the first place. Disad-
vantaged states hold power in possessing a scarce resource that will only rise 
in value. It may be difficult to exercise discretion, but holding to a cogent 
strategy for rural development and choosing projects that meet specific cri-
teria designed to serve this vision is essential. It is the first step to maximiz-
ing the likelihood that benefits will go beyond merely reinforcing patterns of 
hegemony in agrarian societies and result in the type of rural diversification 
that leads to long-term poverty alleviation—and not just a reshuffling of the 
winners and losers in the short term. 
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